Forecasting elections -a challenging, high-stakes problem -is the subject of much uncertainty, subjectivity, and media scrutiny. To shed light on this process, we develop a theory for forecasting elections from the perspective of dynamical systems. Our model borrows ideas from epidemiology, and we use polling data from United States elections to determine its parameters. Surprisingly, our general model performs as well as popular forecasters for the 2012 and 2016 U.S. races for president, Senate, and governor. Although contagion and voting dynamics differ, our work suggests a new approach to elucidate how elections are related across states. It also illustrates the effect of accounting for uncertainty in different ways, provides an illuminating example of data-driven forecasting using dynamical systems, and suggests avenues for future research on political elections. We conclude with our forecast of the senatorial and gubernatorial races on 6 November 2018, which we posted on 5 November.
Introduction
Despite what was largely viewed as an unexpected outcome in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, recent work [1] suggests that national polling data is not becoming less accurate. Election forecasting is a complicated, multi-step process, and it often comes across as a blackbox. It involves polling members of the public, identifying likely voters, adjusting poll results to incorporate demographics, and accounting for other data (such as historical trends). The presence of correlations between states with shared demographics further complicates the picture and adds to the challenge of forecasting elections [2] . The result is a high-stakes, high-interest problem that is rife with uncertainty, incomplete information, and subjective choices [3] . In this paper, we develop a new forecasting method based on dynamical systems and compartmental modeling, and we use it to help unpack U.S. election forecasting.
Two primary types of data are used to forecast elections: polls and "fundamental data". Fundamental data consists of different factors on which voters may base their decisions [4] ; it includes economic data, party membership, and various qualitative measurements (e.g., how well candidates speak) [5, 6] . Mainstream forecasting sources (such as newsletters and major media websites) offer varying levels of detail about their techniques and often rely on a combination of polls and fundamental data. Some analysts forecast vote margins at the state or national level (e.g., [7] [8] [9] [10] ), while others (e.g., [11] [12] [13] [14] ) call outcomes by party without giving margins. (We will refer to the former approaches as "quantitative" and the latter as "qualitative", though quantitative data is typically used in both settings.) Among quantitative forecasters, it is important to distinguish between those who aggregate publicly available polls from a range of sources and those who gather their own in-house polls (e.g., The Los Angeles Times [9] ). For example, FiveThirtyEight [7] is a poll aggregator known for its pollster ratings; they weight polls more heavily from sources that they judge to be more accurate [2] . After adjusting polls to account for factors such as recency, poll sample, convention bounce, and polling source, FiveThirtyEight uses state demographics to correlate random outcomes, such that similar states are more likely to behave similarly [2] .
In the academic literature, many statistical models (e.g., [3, 6, 15] ) combine different variables -including state-level economic indicators, approval ratings, and incumbency -to forecast elections. See [16] for a review. Although some of these methods [15, 17] blend polls and fundamental data, Abramowitz's Time for Change model [18] and the work of Hummel and Rothschild [6] rely on fundamental data without using any polls. Models that are based on fundamental data alone can provide early forecasts, as they do not need to wait for polling data to become available, but these forecasts are not dynamic; they do not measure current opinion. To provide both election-day forecasts and estimates of current opinion, Linzer [19] augmented fundamental data with recent polls using a Bayesian approach. Although the media often stresses daily variance in polls as election campaigns unfold, the political-science community has cautioned that such fluctuations are typically insignificant and may represent differences in technique between polling sources, rather than true shifts in opinion [4, 20, 21] . Therefore, to account for nonrepresentative poll samples or house bias that is inherent in the methods of any given polling source, some statistical models [21, 22] adjust and weight the polling data in different ways (e.g., in a similar vein to FiveThirtyEight [2] ). Alternatively, Wang [23] took a simpler approach, relying on poll aggregation to reduce error and produce accurate forecasts.
Although there is extensive work on mathematical modeling of political behavior (e.g., [24] [25] [26] [27] ) and opinions more generally [28, 29] , most such studies have focused on opinion dynamics or on questions that are related tangentially to elections, rather than on engaging with data-driven forecasting. For example, Braha and de Aguiar [27] and Fernández-Gracia et al. [24] combined generalized voter models with data on election results to comment on vote-share distributions and correlations across U.S. counties. In a series of papers (e.g., [30, 31] ), Galam demonstrated how to use a sociophysics approach (without reliance on polls or fundamental data) to suggest race outcomes and shed light on the dynamics that may underlie various election results.
Accounting for interactions between states is crucial for producing reliable forecasts, and Nate Silver [2] has stressed the importance of correlating polling errors by state demographics. Lauderdale and Linzer [3] have also noted that correlating state outcomes by geography may be particularly useful for forecasts that depend on polling data. These methods, which one can view as indirectly incorporating relationships between states through noise, relies on state similarity, which is inherently an undirected quantity. For example, if Ohio and Pennsylvania are viewed as similar by FiveThirtyEight, so are Pennsylvania and Ohio. However, it is possible that states influence each other in directional ways. For example, voters in Ohio may more strongly influence the population in Pennsylvania than vice versa. The strength at which states influence each other can arise from where candidates are campaigning, the people with whom voters in various states interact, what distant states are featured prominently in the news, which states most resonate with local voters, and other reasons. Linzer [19] estimated national-level influences on state voters on a daily basis using a statistical modeling approach, but we are not aware of prior work that has estimated directed, asymmetric state-state relationships or of poll-based forecasting approaches that take a mathematical modeling perspective.
To make election forecasting more transparent, broaden the community that engages with polling data, and raise research questions from a dynamical-systems perspective, we therefore propose a data-driven mathematical model of the evolution of political opinions during U.S. elections. We utilize a poll-based, poll-aggregating approach to specify model parameters, allowing us to provide quantitative forecasts of the vote margin by state. To help motivate questions, we consider simplicity a strength and thus do not weight or adjust the polling data in any way. Following Wang's example [23] , we strive to be fully transparent; we provide all of our code, data, and detailed reproducibility instructions in the Supplementary Materials. We have a special interest in exploring how states influence each other, and (because it provides a well-established and interdisciplinary way to frame such asymmetric relationships) we borrow techniques from the field of disease modeling. Using a compartmental model of disease dynamics, we treat Democrat and Republican voting intensions as contagions that spread between states. Our model performs well at forecasting the 2012 and 2016 races; and we use it to forecast the 6 November 2018 U.S. governor and Senate elections. (We posted our forecasts [32] on the arXiv on 5 November 2018.) For the 2018 Senate races, we also explore how early we can make accurate forecasts; promisingly, we find that our model is able to produce stable forecasts from early August onward. Most importantly, our model demonstrates how one can employ mathematical tools (e.g., dynamical systems, uncertainty quantification, and network analysis) to help demystify forecasting, explore how subjectivity and uncertainty impact forecasting, and suggest future research directions in the study of political elections. We take the mean of the polls by month to obtain the data points that we show as purple asterisks. We specify parameters by minimizing the difference between our model [3] [4] [5] and these monthly data points. We simulate the evolution of opinions in the year leading up to each election, but we focus on the result at time t = 0 days to the election. (D) For elections with many state races, we combine all reliable Republican and Democrat regions into two "superstates" (in Red and Blue, as we use traditional party colors). We show the superstates for presidential elections; see Table S1 for the superstates that we use in other elections.
population at time t. One then describes infection spread by the following set of ordinary differential equations (ODEs):
where S(t) + I(t) = 1 and γ and β correspond to the rates of disease transmission and recovery, respectively. (For details, see the Supplementary Materials.) The SIS model has been extended to account for more realistic details, such as multiple contagions, communities, and contact structure between individuals or subpopulations [40, 41, 44, 45 ].
Our election model
Our election dynamics model is a two-pronged SIS compartmental model (see Fig. 1A ). First, we reinterpret "susceptible" individuals as undecided (or independent or minor-party) voters. Because most U.S. elections are dominated by two parties, we consider two contagions: Democrat and Republican voting intentions. We track these quantities within each state (and make the assumption that populations are well-mixed within each state). Let 
We account for four behaviors: • Democrat transmission: an undecided voter can decide to vote Democrat due to interactions with Democrats (note that we interpret "interactions" and "transmission" broadly, as discussed below); • Republican transmission: an undecided voter can decide to vote Republican due to interactions with Republicans; • Democrat turnover: an infected person has some chance of changing their mind to undecided (this amounts to "recovering"); and • Republican turnover: an infected person has some chance of becoming undecided (i.e., recovering). Although the language of contagions does not necessarily apply to social dynamics [46], we find it useful to use it in this paper. These terms highlight that our model is not a specialized election model, as part of our goal is to show how a general framework can give meaningful forecasts in high-dimensional systems. We thus expect similar ideas to provide insight into forecasting in many complex systems.
By extending the traditional SIS model [1] [2] to account for two contagions and M states or "superstates" (see Fig. 1D ), we obtain the following ODEs:
where N is the total number of likely voters in the U.S.; N j is the number of likely voters in state j; and γ i D and γ i R describe the rates of committed Democrat and Republican voters, respectively, converting to undecided. Similarly, β ij D and β ij R correspond, respectively, to the transmission (i.e., influence) rates from Democrat and Republican voters in state j to undecided individuals in state i. We obtain our parameters by fitting to a year (or less, in the case of our earlier 2018 forecasts) of state polls (averaged by month to remove small-scale fluctuations; see Fig. 1C ) from HuffPost Pollster [47] and RealClearPolitics [48] ; see Materials and Methods for details. We take measurements of the number of voting-age individuals per state from the Federal Register [49-51], and we assume that all states have the same voter turnout, so this parameter cancels out of our model. Our parameters are different for each election, as we use the data specific to each election for fitting.
The β parameters allow for us to model directed relationships (as a form of network structure) between states, and we take a broad interpretation of "transmission". Although opinion persuasion (i.e., transmission) can occur through communication between undecided and committed voters [52], we expect that it can also occur through campaigning, news coverage, and televised debates. We hypothesize that these venues are an indirect means for voters in one state to influence another. For example, if news coverage of Republican campaigning in Pennsylvania resonates with undecided voters in Ohio, there may be an associated indirect route of opinion transmission from Pennsylvania to Ohio. Therefore, we consider large β ij R to signify that Republicans in state j strongly influence undecided voters in state i, and such "strong influence" may be due either to conversations (or other direct interactions) between voters or due to indirect effects like state-state affinity that is influenced (or activated) by media.
After we fit our parameters to polls for a given election, we use our model [3] [4] [5] to simulate the daily evolution of political opinions from the preceding January through election day. In such simulations, we use the earliest available polling data to specify our initial conditions (see Materials and Methods). We do not claim that our approach is the most accurate forecasting method; instead, we are putting forward a data-driven model that admittedly involves many simplifications, some of which are instructive to mention before we discuss our simulation results. Important simplifications include the following:
• While generally not realistic, we assume voters mix uniformly (e.g., everyone has the same influence on everyone else), aside from the state structure (which is analogous to patches in epidemiology); accounting for additional network structure may improve forecasts [53-55].
• We combine all sources of opinion adoption into time-independent transmission parameters β ij R and β ij D .
• If undecided voters remain at the end of our simulation, we assume that they vote for minor-party candidates or do not vote.
• We assume that all polls are equally accurate. Unlike FiveThirtyEight [2], we do not weight polls more strongly based on recency or make any distinction between partisan and non-partisan polls (or polls of likely voters, registered voters, or all adults). Notably, Wang [23] has shown that, when aggregated, polling data may not need to be weighted or adjusted to account for polling source to be accurate. Despite these simplifications, our model surprisingly performs as well as popular forecasters, as we illustrate next.
Overview of election simulations
We now use our model in Eqns. [3] [4] [5] to simulate past races for governor, Senate, and president. Because realistic forecasts should incorporate uncertainty, we follow this exploration of past races with a short study of the impact of noise on our 2016 presidential forecast. To do this, we introduce a stochastic differential equation (SDE) version of our model; and we then use our SDE model to forecast the gubernatorial and senatorial midterms on 6 November 2018.
and 2016 election forecasts
By fitting our parameters to polling data for senatorial, gubernatorial, and presidential races in 2012 and 2016 without incorporating the final election results, we can simulate forecasts as if we made them on the eve of the respective election days. In Fig. 2 , we summarize our forecasts for these races. As we show in Table 1 [3] [4] [5] . We calculate our 2012 and 2016 forecasts using polling data up until election day; they do not include any election results, and they should be interpreted as forecasts from the night before an election. Comparison of our forecasts for (A, D) governor, (B, E) Senate, and (C, F) president elections with election results from [57, 58] . The horizontal axis shows the percentage-point lead by Democrats (blue) or Republicans (red); shorter bars represent closer elections, and bars that extend to the right (respectively, left) correspond to Republican (respectively, Democrat) leads. We highlight the states that we forecast incorrectly in bold, italic green font. "Safe Red" and "Safe Blue" refer to superstates that are composed, respectively, of reliably Republican-voting and Democrat-voting states. (We assemble the superstates based on forecaster opinions and historical data; see Materials and Methods for details.) See Table S1 for the list of states that each superstate consists of for each election.
Accounting for and interpreting uncertainty
Election forecasting involves not only calling a race for a specific party and estimating vote shares, but also specifying the likelihood of different outcomes. This raises a third goal of forecasters, (3) quantifying uncertainty (e.g., estimating a given candidate's chance of winning an election). We suggest that this is one of the key places where mathematical techniques can contribute to election forecasting. We explore randomness by generalizing our model [3] [4] [5] to a system of SDEs: [3] [4] [5] and two popular sources. We report success rates for governor and Senate elections based only on the states for which forecasts are available from our model (see Table S1 . This type of error makes it possible for polls of a bloc of states to all be wrong together, leading to an unforeseen upset. To explore these dynamics, we compare the impact of uncorrelated noise with the effect of additive noise correlated on a few sample demographics; specifically, we consider the fractions of Black, Hispanic, and college-educated individuals in a population (see Materials and Methods). We correlate on these demographics because these data are readily available; future work should incorporate additional data.
We account for uncertainty by tweaking the populations in each state at every time step by a small random number; when noise is uncorrelated, we pick these numbers independently. By contrast, correlated noise implies that the numbers are related in similar states. Simulating many (e.g., we use 10, 000) elections then results in a distribution of possible outcomes and allows us to quantify uncertainty. As an example, we show the distributions that result from these methods for the 2016 presidential race in Fig. 3 .
Our initial analysis illustrates how accounting for uncertainty in different ways influences forecasts, echoing points raised by Nate Silver and his team [2]. In Fig. 3 , we demonstrate that uncorrelated noise, which can model uncertainty in a single state or a poll without assuming a larger systematic (e.g., country-wide) polling error, results in a low likelihood of a Republican win in 2016. By contrast, correlating outcomes by demographics, which can model systematic polling errors (e.g., due to misidentifying likely voters) in similar states, increases Donald Trump's chances by a factor of about four. This agrees with Silver's comment [2] that failing to account for correlated errors tends to result in underestimations of a trailing candidate's chances. As we discuss in the Supplementary Materials, it is worth noting that, due to an indexing error in one of our files, in an earlier version of our model, we correlated state outcomes on the demographics of the wrong states. After correcting this error, we obtained similar results, suggesting that it is the mere presence of correlated noise that improves Trump's chances and this noise does not need to be correlated by the specific state demographics (namely, the fractions of Black, Hispanic, and college-educated individuals in a population) that we used. Lauderdale and Linzer [3] , for example, have suggested state outcomes are correlated by geography, and FiveThirtyEight [2] correlates on party, region, and religion, as well as race, ethnicity, and education.
In our analysis, we do not attempt to account directly for errors in polls. Instead, we take the simple approach of assuming that we can incorporate all sources of uncertainty as an additive noise term in our model [6] [7] [8] . There has been extensive work on quantifying uncertainty (see [59] ); exploring alternative ways of accounting for uncertainty is an important future direction for research on forecasting complex systems.
Senate and governor forecasts
The 2018 midterms provided a fantastic opportunity for us to test our model. Our final forecasts, which we [32] when the data becomes available from RealClearPolitics [48] . The latest polls in our governor and Senate data sets were completed on 1 November and 2 November, respectively. Note that polls do not always become available in the temporal order of polling day (e.g., RealClearPolitics [48] occasionally updates their website with additional early polls, despite their prior posting of more recent polls), so this does not imply that our data include all of the polls up until these dates.) We account for uncertainty by correlating noise on education, ethnicity, and race (as in Fig. 3B ) and average across 10, 000 simulated elections to obtain our forecasts (Because of computational time constraints, we based our original Senate forecast from 5 November on fewer than 10, 000 simulations and used a larger time step than usual for parameter fitting. Additionally, after checking our polling data without the election-day rush, we found several typos that we have corrected for the forecasts in the main text. See the Supplementary Materials for details. We include our original forecasts [32] from 5 November 2018 in Figs. S1-S3. In the main text, we instead present the forecasts that we obtain using our typical simulation parameters. Importantly, both of these forecasts project the same candidate to win in each state.) In Fig. 4 and S4, we compare our governor and Senate forecasts with those of several popular sources. Our results in Table 2 Florida gubernatorial race by 0.4 percentage points over the Republican nominee (DeSantis), whereas FiveThirtyEight projected that Gillum would win by 4.2 points. DeSantis edged out Gillum by 0.4 points, so our margin of error was 0.8 points and FiveThirtyEight's was 4.6 points for this specific race. In comparison, the mean margins of error that were reported in the polls [48] on which we based our parameters were 4.1 and 4.0 for the governor and Senate data, respectively. Critically, this reported error is sampling error only; it does not account for other sources of error, such as ones from unrepresentative polling samples, which can result in error that is correlated by demographics [62] . Across the 2018 races we forecast individually in Fig. 4 , FiveThirtyEight's forecasts were roughly 1 percentage point closer on average to the real vote margins than our model. While straightforward, the drawback of measuring accuracy by vote margin is that one can apply this method only to quantitative forecasters (see Table 2 ). The baseline measure of how well forecasters do at calling race outcomes -specifically, of whether a state will elect a Republican or a Democrat -often attracts media attention. As we illustrate in Table 2 
where E is the number of states that we treat individually (so E = 13 and E = 14 for the 2018 governor and Senate races, respectively), y i = 1 if the projected candidate wins in state i and y i = 0 otherwise, and p i is the probability (see the percentages in Figs. 4B and 4C) that we assign to the projected winning candidate in state i. For qualitative forecast categorizations, we specify p i = 0.5 for Toss-up, p i = 0.55 for Tilt, p i = 0.675 for Lean, p i = 0.85 for Likely, and p i = 0.975 for Solid. As we show in Table 2 , our forecasts from Eqns. [6-8] rank second and third (for the Senate and governor races, respectively) among our example popular forecasters according to log-loss error. In comparison to the log-loss errors in Table 2 , a log-loss error of 0.7 corresponds to a hypothetical forecast that assigns a 50% chance to every race. Thus far, we have focused largely on producing final forecasts, in part because public attention often centers on how forecasts from the eve of an election compare to race outcomes and in part because our work is a first step toward data-driven election forecasting from a dynamical-systems perspective. It is important to note, however, that the most meaningful forecasts are those in the weeks and months leading up to an election day, and there is particular value in forecasts that remain stable across time [16, 19, 23] . Moreover, forecasting early is a particularly challenging problem and provides a more comprehensive view of model value [19] . To begin to address these ideas, we show earlier forecasts for the 2018 races in Fig. 4B and 4C . We base these forecasts on less polling data. (For example, our 8 July forecast uses polling data up until and including 8 July.) We use the same superstate categorizations in our earlier forecasts as we do in our final forecasts, which rely on the categorizations of popular forecasters in August and November (see Materials and Methods). Notably, our July, August, September, and October forecasts of swing states in the Senate races are as accurate at calling race outcomes as our final forecasts (see Fig. 4C ). As the election nears and we incorporate more polling data into our model, our performance, measured by log-loss error and vote-margin error, improves. This supports observations [17, 20] that polling data becomes more reliable over time. In comparison to missed 4 states a week before the election. Studying election dynamics is an important direction of future research, and we raise a few questions in this area in the Discussion.
Discussion
We developed a general mathematical modeling method for forecasting elections by adapting ideas from compartmental modeling and epidemiology; and we illustrated the promise of such a dynamical-systems approach by applying it to the U.S. races for president, Senate, and governor in 2012 and 2016. When making our modeling choices, we tried to avoid incorporating specificity into our methodology. Despite our approach of using poll data without any weighting adjustments, as well as clear differences between contagion spreading and voting dynamics, we achieved similar success rates as popular forecasters at calling final race outcomes. Moreover, we were able to forecast the outcomes of the Senate elections in 2018 using polling data prior to August 2018 with the same accuracy as FiveThirtyEight's final forecast [7] . This heartening result suggests that our approach is promising.
We consider our model's generality and interdisciplinary, borrowed nature a virtue in this initial dynamical-systems effort, as part of our goal is to help demystify election prediction, highlight future research directions on the forecasting of elections (and other complex systems), and motivate a broader research community to engage more actively with pollster interpretations and polling data. There are many ways to build on our basic modeling approach and more realistically account for voter interactions.
To give one example, it will be useful to be more nuanced about how to handle undecided and minor-party voters. FiveThirtyEight [2] assigns a voting opinion (mostly to one of the major parties) to any undecided voters who remain on election day, and the The Huffington Post factors undecided voters into an election's uncertainty [8] . By contrast, we assumed that any undecided voters left at the end of our simulations are either minor-party voters or simply do not vote. Using the fraction of undecided voters to inform our choice of noise strength is an interesting direction to pursue. Moreover, because we compare our model with some popular qualitative forecasters, we showed our forecasts as projected vote margins rather than absolute Republican and Democrat percentages. It may be desirable for future studies to look more closely at how the fractions of Republicans, Democrats, and undecided voters evolve in time as in [19, 22] .
We assumed that all polls are equally accurate (e.g., we did not consider the time to election and pollster-reported error), and we did not distinguish between partisan and non-partisan polls or between polls of likely voters, registered voters, and adults. This minimal, poll-aggregating approach echoes the work of Wang [23] . By contrast, FiveThirtyEight In this initial study of election dynamics from a poll-based, dynamical-systems perspective, we took a macroscopic, simplified view of state and voter interactions. We chose to base our approach on compartmental modeling of contagion spreading because it gives a well-established, multidisciplinary way to include asymmetric state-state relationships in our model. However, when a social behavior or opinion appears to spread in a community, it is often difficult to determine whether transmission is actually occurring. In particular, the appearance of "spreading" may emerge because social contagions are truly spreading between individuals (that is, individuals are influencing each other) or because people form relationships with others who are similar to them and behave in a similar way (e.g., adapting the same opinion) due to their shared characteristics [66] . By building more detailed mathematical models of voter behavior in the future, one can help elucidate what role influence plays in political opinion dynamics.
Our model assumes that every voting-age individual is equally likely to interact with any other voter in the U.S.
While 17, 20] . With a finer view on polls, one can explore the possible effects of such time-specific events (e.g., a large rally or a story about a candidate in the media) using our modeling framework. Similarly, one can build feedback mechanisms into a model to test how the perception of future election results influences an individual's likelihood of voting. The framework of dynamical systems provides a valuable approach for exploring the time evolution of opinions, as well as their interplay with external forces (such as the media, rallies, and conventions).
Our compartmental-model approach allowed us to obtain parameters that are related to the strengths of interactions between states and measurements of voter turnover by state for each election year and race (see Figs. S5-7) . By comparing these parameters across years and different types of elections, one can help identify blocs of states that are related persistently, analyze which states have the most plastic voter populations, and suggest differences in the political dynamics in presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial races. One can also use our parameters from previous elections to provide early forecasts for upcoming races prior to when large-scale polling data becomes available. These and other future research directions could provide insight into how state relationships evolve across years, allowing researchers to identify ways that the U.S. electorate may be changing in time and, in turn, suggest valuable ideas to incorporate into future forecasts. 
Materials and Methods

Data sets
Selecting superstates
We focus on forecasting elections in swing states and treat all reliably Red and Blue states together as two "superstate" conglomerates. (We do not specify that these superstates actually vote Republican and Democrat, respectively; rather, that is an output of our models.) This raises the question of how to identify states as "safe" or "swing", and we do this differently for different elections. For presidential races, we define our swing states as those identified by FiveThirtyEight as "traditional swing states" [73] ; these are CO, FL, IA, MI, MN, NV, NH, NC, OH, PA, VA, and WI (see Fig. 1D ). Thus, for the presidential elections, M = 14 in Eqns. [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
Uncertainty
The noise strength in Eqns. [6-8] is σ = 0.0015 for all our "probabilistic forecasts" (namely those which use the SDEs [6-8]). We choose σ so that our 80% confidence intervals have a similar length as those in FiveThirtyEight's 2016 pollsonly presidential forecasts [56] . (We approximate the latter's 80% confidence intervals as ranging between 13 and 19 percentage points in length.) We base each probabilistic forecast but one on 10, 000 simulations of Eqns. [6-8]. (The only exception is our forecast in Figs. S1B and S1C, which we base on 4, 000 simulations.) For the forecasts in Figs. 3B, 4, and S4, we include correlated noise in Eqns. [6-8]. We quantify the similarity of 2 states using the Jaccard index J = min{D i , D j }/ max{D i , D j }, where D i is the fraction of a given demographic in state i and D j is the fraction for that demographic in state j. The Jaccard index indicates the covariance for W i R and W i S . We consider 3 sample demographics: J B , J E , and J H are the Jaccard indices that we find using the fractions of Non-Hispanic Black individuals, individuals without a college education, and Hispanic individuals, respectively. We calculate J B and J E using 2016 U.S. Census Bureau [76] data and base J H on data from 247WallSt.com [77] . We obtain J B , J E , and J H for the superstates by averaging the demographics of these states. (Note that we do not weight these averages by state size.) For our forecasts with correlated noise, each time that we simulate an election, we select one Jaccard index uniformly at random among J B , J E , and J H to use as our covariance. Thus, for each such simulated election, we may randomly tweak a set of states with a similar feature (e.g., high Hispanic population) in the same direction (e.g., in favor of the Democrat candidate) at one time.
Parameter fitting
To fit model parameters for a given election (e.g., the 2012 Senate races), we first format the associated polling data. First, we assign each poll a time point by averaging its start and end dates. Because some states are polled more frequently than others, we reduce the number T of polling data points that we use to fit one of our models to T = 11 per state (or superstate) for our November forecasts. We do this by binning the polls for each state in 30-day increments that extend backward from the appropriate election day (6 November 2012, 8 November 2016, or 6 November 2018). (We made one adjustment to this rule for the 2012 presidential race: for this race, our earliest bin includes polls from between 400 and 300 days until the election if there are no polls within 330 days of the election; in all other cases, our earliest bin includes polls between 330 and 300 days to the election.) For our earlier forecasts in Fig. 4B and 4C, we use a smaller subset of the polling data. For example, to forecast the Senate elections on 7 August, we bin the polling data that falls between 330 and 90 days of the election in 30-day increments to obtain T = 8 bins. We then average within these bins to arrive at T data points per state. If a given state has no polls within a bin, we approximate the associated data point by linear interpolation. In many cases, there are no polls for a state early in the year, so we set all missing early data points for that state to its earliest data point. To arrive at T data points each for the Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates, we average across the T individual data points for each of the states within these conglomerates. (We weight these averages by the state voting-age population sizes.)
We let
..,T denote the T data points for state j that we obtain through the above process. The variables R j (t i ), D j (t i ), and U j (t i ) are the fractions of Republicans, Democrats, and others in state j at time point t i . To describe our fitting procedure, we define a "concentration" vector
where M is the number of states and superstates that we forecast for the given election (see Table S1 ). For a candidate set of parameters, (β, γ) = {β
..,M , we define c β,γ to be the solution of Eqns. [3] [4] [5] under these parameters:
We obtain our parameters (β,γ) for the given election by minimizing the least-squares deviation between the averaged polling data and the solutions of Eqns. [3] [4] [5] at the T time points considered:
These estimators are consistent and converge weakly to Gaussian laws if data is from a density-dependent Markov jump process [78] . Note that we fit our parameters using the deterministic version of our model [3] [4] [5] . To simulate elections, we use these parameters in Eqns. [3] [4] [5] and the SDE version of our model, which we showed in Eqns. [6] [7] [8] . In each figure caption, we indicate the version of our model that we used for simulations in that figure.
Numerical implementation
For parameter fitting, we use the OPTIM routine in R (version 3. We posted our forecasts for the 2018 Senate and governor races on the arXiv preprint server at [32] on 5 November, the 3 eve of the midterm elections that were held on 6 November 2018. We collect these original forecasts in Figs. S1, S2, 4 and S3. After checking our results without the election time rush, we found that we made some errors when gathering 5 the data. These errors, which we have corrected in the forecasts that we present in the main text (although note that our 6 original forecasts and those in the main manuscript forecast the same candidates to win each race), are as follows:
7
• We incorrectly copied the results for the last Rhode Island Senate poll, which took place 20-24 October 2018.
8
Because we include Rhode Island in our "Safe Blue" superstate, this error led to a difference of less than 0.5 9 percentage points in the Republican and Democrat percentages at one time point in the "Safe Blue" data that we 10 used to fit model parameters.
11
• We neglected to incorporate the only Washington poll in our Senate data into the polling data that we averaged for 12 the "Safe Blue" superstate.
13
• We incorrectly copied the Republican vote share for the last Maine governor poll, which took place 27-29 October; 14 instead of using 42%, we had 37%.
15
• Instead of correlating noise for each state in Eqns. [6-8] using its associated demographic information as described 16 in Materials and Methods, we incorrectly ordered the demographic information in one file, such that we were not 17 associating the correct demographic data to each state. This error does not have a strong impact on our forecasts, 18 suggesting that the critical point is to correlate noise in some way and that this way does not necessarily need to 19 be by demographics.
20
These errors occur only in Figs. S1, S2, and S3. Additionally, because of time constraints, we generated our final Senate 21 forecasts (based on data from [48] that we gathered through 3 November), which we show in Fig. S1B and S1C, using a 22 time step of 0.5 months for parameter fitting and based on only 4, 000 simulated elections. In all other cases, we specify 
Special Cases and Notes
27
Working with election data is often messy, and we comment on a few special cases in our work. races, we do not provide forecasts of these races.
(6) Early forecasts: For our 8 July forecasts of the 2018 Senate races in Fig. 4C , the Minnesota special election had 48 no polls prior to 8 July, so we remove this race from our model for this forecast only.
49
Alternative Ways of Measuring Forecast Accuracy
The dynamics of transmission and recovery in the traditional susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model are described by the following coupled ordinary differential equations: 
Writing this system in terms of the population fractions, S(t) =S(t)/N and I(t) =Ĩ(t)/N , and dividing by N yields 118
Eqns. [1] [2] .
119
A similar process yields our two-pronged deterministic SIS model (see Eqns. [3] [4] [5] in the main text) for election forecasting. The key difference is how we define
We thereby estimate the number of interactions between undecided voters in state i and Democrats in state j, for example,
120
as the mean number of interactions that involve an undecided voter in state i multiplied by the probability that the 121 interaction is with someone in state j multiplied by the probability that someone in state j is a Democrat. . We generated our 3 November forecasts using polls from [48] through 3 November 2018. (We only categorize states that we have not already designated as "Safe Red" or "Safe Blue"; see Table S1 for details.) Each number indicates the chance of a Democrat (respectively, Republican) winning if it is in a blue (respectively, red) box. For toss-up states, each number is red (respectively, blue) if it corresponds to a Republican's (respectively, Democrat's) chance of winning. FiveThirtyEight's values are based on the "classic" version of their model that was updated at 1:19 PM Eastern Time on 4 November. (C) Map of the state ratings as forecast by our model using data through 3 November. We generate our forecasts by simulating Eqns. [6-8] 10, 000 times for (A) and the first column of (B) and 4, 000 times for (C) and the last column of (B). For the forecasts in (C) and the rightmost column in (B), we used a time step for parameter fitting that is five times larger than what we use in our other forecasts. Table S1 for a summary of the states that we include in our Safe Red and Safe Blue superstates. (B) Our 2018 governor forecasts are based on polling data that we collected from RealClearPolitics [48] through 3 November. We also show the forecasts of FiveThirtyEight [7] on 4 November 2018. (The margins that we reproduce from their website are from the "classic" version that was updated at 4:50 PM Eastern Time on 4 November.) Here we show the expected margins only for swing states; we forecast the mean margin in the Safe Red superstate to be +18.5 points for Republicans and the mean margin in the Safe Blue superstate to be +15.6 points for Democrats. We generate our forecasts in (A, B) by simulating 10, 000 realizations of Eqns. Margin lead by party (percentage points) Fig. S4 : 2018 Senate forecasts.We base our forecasts on 10, 000 elections that we simulate using Eqns. figure, we show the parameters to 6 decimal places; see Data file S4 for more precise numbers.) As an example, this figure shows the Republican transmission parameters (in units of 1/month) for our 2018 senatorial forecasts using polling data that we obtained from [48] through 3 November 2018. We obtain these parameters by fitting the deterministic version of our model (see Eqns. [3] [4] [5] ) to polling data. To simulate elections, we use these parameters in the stochastic version of our model (see Eqns. [6] [7] [8] .) The first column gives our γ i R parameters, which describe the rate at which Republicans become undecided (in units of 1/months), and the second column gives γ i D , the rate at which Democrats become undecided (again, in units of 1/months). To further clarify our notation, note that γ TX R describes the rate at which Texas Republicans become undecided. These parameters suggest that committed voters do not typically change their minds within an election year. One can interpret 1/γ i x (where x ∈ {D, R}) as the mean time that "committed" voters stay committed to their opinion before becoming undecided [43] . Our parameter values suggest that the least committed voters in the 2018 Senate races were New Jersey Democrats, yet 1/γ NJ D ≈ 1.57 years is still a long time on the scale of one election. We show the parameters to 6 decimal points; for additional precision (and the parameters that we use to simulate other elections), see Data File S4. We showed the mean vote-margin error that we computed using option (3) in Table 2 (2) 6.5 pts. 4.0 pts. Table S3 : Alternative ways of computing log-loss error for the 2018 governor and Senate races. Also see Table 2 and Table S2 . As we discussed in the text of the Supplementary Materials, our use of superstates yields a few options for computing log-loss error. Briefly, in option (1) the-odds-of-an-electoral-college-popular-vote-split-are-increasing/, 
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